Wittgenstein and the Possibility of Meaning

Wittgenstein and the Possibility of Meaning develops a new, non-reductionist response to the sceptical argument about meaning famously developed in by Kripke. Alexander Miller argues that understanding an expression is a matter of having an intention to exercise one's ability to use it in accord with its meaning or correctness condition.

Alexander Miller is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Otago, New Zealand. He was educated at the universities of Glasgow, St. Andrews, and Michigan (Ann Arbor). He has previously held teaching positions at Nottingham, Birmingham, Cardiff, and Macquarie. He is an associate editor of the Australasian Journal of Philosophy.

- Introduction - 1: Rule-Following, Meaning, and Content - 2: Kripkeâs Wittgensteinâs Sceptical Argument - 3: Boghossian and Wright on Blind Rule-Following - 4: Blind Rule-Following, Properly Construed - 5: A Non-Reductionist Response to Kripkeâs Wittgensteinâs Sceptical Argument - Epilogue