Agency and Answerability

Since the 1970s Gary Watson has published a series of brilliant and highly influential essays on human action, examining such questions as: in what ways are we free and not free, rational and irrational, responsible or not for what we do? Moral philosophers and philosophers of action will welcome this collection, representing one of the most important bodies of work in the field.

Introduction
I. Freedom, Will, and Agency
1: Free Agency
2: Skepticism about Weakness of Will
3: Disordered Appetites: Addiction, Compulsion, and Dependence
4: Volitional Necessities
5: The Work of the Will
II. Agency and Necessity
6: Free Action and Free Will
7: Soft Libertarianism and Hard Compatibilism
III. Responsibility and Answerability
8: Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme
9: Two Faces of Responsibility
10: Reasons and Responsibility
11: Excusing Addiction
Bibliography
Index