Resemblance Nominalism

Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra offers a fresh philosophical account of properties. How is it that two different things (such as two red roses) can share the same property (redness)? According to resemblance nominalism, things have their properties in virtue of resembling other things. This unfashionable view is championed with clarity and rigor.

Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra is Fellow and Tutor of Philosophy at Hertford College, Oxford.

Introduction
1: The Problem of Universals: A Problem about Truthmakers
2: The Explananda of the Problems of Universals
3: The Many over One
4: Resemblance Nominalism
5: The Coextension Difficulty
6: Russell's Regress
7: The Resemblance Structure of Property Classes
8: Goodman's Difficulties
9: The Imperfect Community Difficulty
10: The Companionship Difficulty
11: The Mere Intersections Difficulty
12: The Superiority of Resemblance Nominalism
Appendix: On Imperfect Communities and the Non-communities they Entail
References, Index