The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1956-1975

This book provides a comprehensive view of the struggle between the superpowers during the Cold War, the circumstances that led to the Six Day War in June 1967, Israeli and Egyptian policies following the war, and the ever-deepening American involvement in the region versus the USSR's lessening impact.

Moshe Gat is Professor Emeritus of Political Studies and European Modern History. He was formerly Head of History Department and Head of Political Studies Department at Bar Ilan University, Israel

Introduction 1. Anatomy of decline: Anglo-Soviet competition in the Middle East, 1956-1967 2. On the use of air power and its effect on the outbreak of the Six Day War 3. Retaliatory raids as an accelerating factor leading to the Six Day War 4. Let someone else do the job: American policy on the Eve of the Six Day War 5. Levi Eshkol: an Israeli leader in the years leading to the Six Day War 6. Nasser and the Six Day War, 5 June 1967: a premediated strategy or an inexorable drift to war? 7. Britain and Israel before and after the Six Day War, June 1967: from support to hostility 8. Military Power and Foreign Policy Inaction: Israel, 1967-1973 9. Yitzhak Rabin, Ambassador to Washington, 1968-1973: a diplomat and policy-maker 10. Kissinger and the road to the Interim Agreement (Sinai II) between Israel and Egypt, September 1975