Decision Costs and Democracy

This title was first published in 2001. This text addressses the variations in democratic institutional design and seeks to determine not only if these differences matter, but also to explain how they matter. Using data from established, economically weel-off systems, the book shows that not only are there a multitude of ways to construct a democracy but also how a democracy is constructed influences the outcomes produced by that system. That is to say, institutional differences create distinct incentives for behaviour that in turn influence the type of outcome produced.

Robert E. Bohrer II

1: Institutional Variety and Democracy; 2: Democratic Institutions and Decision Costs; 3: Constructing an Index of Inclusion; 4: Consequences of Inclusion: Part I - Expenditure Patterns; 5: Governments and Markets: Risk and Volatility; 6: Consequences of Inclusion: Part II - Bond Markets and Taxation; 7: Democratic Costs: Northern Ireland and the French Fourth Republic; 8: Institutions, Democracy and Costs: Conclusions