Bertrand Russell and the Nature of Propositions

This book offers the first defence of the Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement (MRTJ). Lebens reviews the historical story of the theory: What led Russell to deny the existence of propositions altogether? What role did G. F. Stout play in the evolution of the theory? What was Wittgenstein's concern with the theory, and, if we can't know what his concern was exactly, then what are the best contending hypotheses? And why did Russell give the theory up? Lebens makes the case that Russell's concerns with the theory weren't worth its rejection. Moreover, he argues that the MRTJ does most of what we could want from an account of propositions at little philosophical cost.

Samuel Lebens is a Senior Research Fellow in the Philosophy Department at the University of Haifa, Israel.

1. Framing Our Question Part I: The Philosophical and Historical Background 2. Russell and Moore in Rebellion 3. Incomplete Symbols 4. Semantics, Assertion and the Theory of Descriptions Part II: The Rise and Fall of the MRTJ 5. The Rise of the MRTJ 6. The Stoutian Evolution of the MRTJ 7. The Demise of the MRTJ Part III: Resurrecting the MRTJ 8. Significance and Representation 9. Molecular Proposition 10. Explaining of Explanada 11. The MRTJ and its Competitors