Probabilistic Knowledge

Sarah Moss argues that in addition to full beliefs, credences can constitute knowledge. She introduces the notion of probabilistic content and shows how it plays a central role not only in epistemology, but in the philosophy of mind and language. Just you can believe and assert propositions, you can believe and assert probabilistic contents.

Sarah Moss is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. She received her A.B. in Mathematics from Harvard University and her B.Phil. in Philosophy from Oxford University, where she studied as a Marshall Scholar. She received her Ph.D. in Philosophy with a minor in Linguistics from MIT in 2009.

1: The case for probabilistic contents
2: The case for probabilistic assertion
3: Epistemic modals and probability operators
4: Indicative conditionals
5: The case for probabilistic knowledge
6: Factivity
7: Skepticism
8: Knowledge and belief
9: Knowledge and action
10: Knowledge and persons
Appendix: A formal semantics for epistemic vocabulary